Baker Institute paper: US needs to rethink strategy in the Middle East

The United States must rethink its strategy in addressing key Middle East concerns, from the Islamic State to Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, according to a joint paper by experts at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy and the Center for the National Interest. They advocate for the U.S. to use its substantial military, economic and diplomatic means to overcome recent shortcomings in the region and influence developments to the country’s advantage.

Credit: thinkstockphotos.com/Rice University

“Rethinking U.S. Strategy in the Middle East” was co-authored by Joe Barnes, the Bonner Means Baker Fellow at the Baker Institute, and Andrew Bowen, senior fellow and director of Middle East studies at the Center for the National Interest.

“As we will stress in this paper, any such strategy must go beyond the usual bromides of U.S. ‘leadership’ and ‘engagement,’ terms routinely deployed in the absence of any consideration of what the goals of that leadership and engagement should be,” the authors said. “U.S. leadership and engagement must, of course, play a part in any U.S. strategy in the Middle East. But leadership and engagement must be subservient to the objectives of U.S. strategy, which are the protection and, if possible, the advancement of our core interests in the region.”

Barnes and Bowen concede policymakers and opinion shapers are aware of those interests, ranging from the unimpeded flow of oil to international markets to reducing the threat of terrorism to the U.S. But they said such considerations can often be lost during a crisis when there is a rapidly deteriorating situation and the demands for decisive action “can lead to policies unmoored from a sober assessment of the United States’ true stakes in the conflict.”

“A successful strategy must possess the flexibility needed to address rapidly changing events; an understanding of the limits of U.S. power, as significant as it is; the necessity of matching abstract rhetoric to actual policies; the imperative of accepting trade-offs — even excruciating ones — between U.S. interests and values; and an appreciation of the risks posed by ‘mission creep,’ by which limited, short-term interventions can expand in scope and lengthen in duration,” the authors said. “But the first and, arguably, most critical step is to ‘get back to basics’ by a hardheaded examination of our core interests.”

The authors provide recommendations on a range of issues of strategic importance, from Iraq to oil and terrorism. In addressing Iraq, “the U.S. needs to be realistic about what it can accomplish …,” they said. “Containment of ISIL comes first; without the introduction of substantial U.S. ground forces, retaking Sunni areas will be a long-term project. Even should major population centers be occupied by anti-ISIL forces, the U.S. can expect continued low-level combat; and the arming of anti-ISIL Sunni Arabs may simply lay the groundwork for more sectarian conflict if and when the immediate ISIL threat subsides.”

Looking to Syria, the U.S. should pursue a policy of enhanced containment that focuses on how the U.S., working with its allies, can better support Syria’s neighbors as they deal with the security and socio-economic challenges posed by an ongoing civil war across their border, the authors said. “The stability of these states, which in the case of Jordan and Israel are long-standing allies of the U.S., is critical for the stability of the region and the protection of the United States’ interests in the region,” they said.

In relations with Iran, it is in the interest of the U.S. to conclude a nuclear deal that substantially extends the amount of time it would take Tehran to achieve “breakout” nuclear capacity, the authors said. “The provisional arrangement announced in April 2015 is an important step in this direction,” they said. “The opposition to any final agreement will be fierce. But the question is not whether any such agreement is the best we could have achieved; it is whether any such agreement is preferable to the alternatives.”

When it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peace, the U.S. should be “very wary of launching another high-level round of negotiations without a clear signal from both Israel and the Palestinian Authority that they are prepared to make new and significant concessions,” the authors said. “Such high-level negotiations not only raise expectations the U.S. must be prepared to meet, they can also — as witnessed by (Secretary of State John) Kerry’s intensive involvement in his failed 2013-2015 initiative — consume the immensely valuable time of senior U.S. policymakers.”